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But as to the particular movements which made this process in his 
[Grandcourt's] baffling mind, Lush could only toss up his chin in despair 
of a theory.1 
WHILE much critical discussion of Daniel Deronda has centered upon the novel's two major figures, exploring 
such subjects as the psychological complexity of 
Gwendolen's development and the unnaturally idealized nature 
of the eponymous hero, analysis of the work's third principal 
character, Henleigh Mallinger Grandcourt, has advanced little 
beyond Lush's plea for an answer to his superior's "baffling 
mind." Yet this seemingly enigmatic personality demands 
closer attention.2 For Grandcourt is at once as complex a figure 
as Gwendolen and a more serious critical problem than 
Deronda, and his character and role within the novel illuminate 
a seldom explored facet of Eliot's philosophic-moral thought: her 
ambivalent response to the question of human evil. 
This ambivalence is subtly yet clearly manifested. 
Throughout the greater portion of the work, Eliot forms 
Grandcourt into her most uncompromising depiction of 
deliberate evil, essaying a detailed study of sadistic sexuality 
and power-lust. Later in the novel, however, in several brief yet 
significant authorial comments, Eliot introduces various 
mitigating factors, decidedly altering the nature of Grand-
court's character and in turn the reader's response to his 
thematic role. The essential problem lies in the degree of 
conscious perception which Eliot attributes to Grandcourt, his 
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ability to comprehend both his own motives and the workings of 
another's mind. The earlier depiction leaves no doubt that 
Grandcourt is acutely aware of his own nature, possesses an 
equally insightful perception of his victims' weaknesses, and 
employs, through such knowledge, the precise means — 
economic, emotional, sexual — to gratify his power-lust. Eliot's 
later qualifications, in contrast, transform that perceptiveness 
into self-deluded egoism whereby Grandcourt seems unable (or 
unwilling) to acknowledge either his own desires or his victims' 
inner fears, his deliberate evil becoming unconscious and 
rationalized. 
Merely to point out inconsistencies in an author's depiction of 
character is seldom a useful task, and my purpose here is not a 
further attack on Daniel Deronda's artistic flaws. Eliot's 
modifications in Grandcourt's character raise larger questions 
about the capacity of her humanistic moral theory to 
accommodate all the varieties of human experience and action, 
particularly the darker impulses of the human psyche. U . C. 
Knoepflmacher offers a similar observation. "Humanism," he 
argues, "minimized the existence of sin and evil," and thus 
compelled Eliot "to disregard her own sense of human depravity 
and to distort character in order to remain faithful to the 
profound idealism on which her 'humanism' was built.3 
Knoepflmacher does not extend this argument to Grandcourt, 
although Grandcourt is unquestionably Eliot's clearest and 
most thematically significant example of such character 
distortion. As many critics have noted, "for Eliot the essential 
thing, the foundation of genuine benevolence, is not feeling as 
such but understanding,"4 an awareness of the "I-Thou" 
relationship. Adam Bede and Silas Marner must learn to 
enlarge the range of their sympathetic contact with the other, 
while Dorothea and Deronda must learn to direct their 
immaturely vagrant sympathies to realistic ends; the 
inter-dependence of sympathy and understanding forms the 
cardinal basis of all Eliot's moral thought. In this final novel, 
however, in counterbalancing juxtaposition to the ideal moral 
nature of Deronda, Eliot offers her most searching critical 
analysis of the sympathetic imagination, acknowledging, 
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through the depiction of Henleigh Grandcourt, that this 
"I-Thou" construct is a far from certain basis for secular 
morality. For like Deronda, Grandcourt displays a penetrating 
knowledge of the other's "equivalent centre of self,"5 but that 
insightfulness does not quicken his moral sense. Rather, 
because his awareness of the other's inner life vitally enhances 
the piquancy of his dominance, Grandcourt's "non-sympathetic" 
imagination is the principal means by which he enacts and 
gratifies his lust for mastery. 
Such a figure, unprecedented among Eliot's darker char-
acters, necessarily challenges her moral thought. In order for 
Grandcourt to be accommodated within Daniel Deronda's 
idealistic humanism, his conscious cruelty must be denied; and 
it is precisely those qualities of self-knowledge, intention, and 
imaginative identification with the other that Eliot's authorial 
commentary annuls. In this discussion I will explore the 
complexities of Grandcourt's changing role in Daniel Deronda, 
analysing Eliot's efforts to question the limitations of 
imaginative sympathy as a basis for morality and her 
subsequent attempts to palliate the disturbing portrait she 
creates. 
" 'That is my notion about the plants: they are often bored, and 
that is the reason why some of them have got poisonous' "(p. 
171). Gwendolen's comment, however playfully intended, 
represents the novel's principal insight into the underlying 
basis of Grandcourt's perversion. As Erich Fromm maintains, 
"the bored person often is the organizer of a 'mini-Colosseum' in 
which he produces his small-scale equivalents of the large-scale 
cruelty staged in the Collosseum."6 Perhaps more moralistic 
than psychological, Fromm's central description of the sadistic 
character is nonetheless an enlightening approach to Grand-
court's nature. For Fromm, "the core of sadism, common to all its 
manifestations, is the passion to have absolute and unrestricted 
control over a living being,"1 a passion generated by the need to 
compensate for a deep-rooted psychical impotence: "What the 
sadist is striving for is power over people, precisely because he 
lacks the power to be."s He has no creative, spontaneous contact 
with life, realizing his only emotional gratification by bending 
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others to his will. Sadism, in short, "is the transformation of 
impotence into the experience of omnipotence; it is the religion of 
psychical cripples."9 
Although the precise sources of Grandcourt's perversion are 
obscure, the nature of his "poisonous" personality is clearly 
expressed. Like the Frommian sadist, Grandcourt is a "remnant 
of a human being" (p. 456) whom the years "were dulling into a 
more and more neutral obstinacy" (p. 391) and whose 
benumbing ennui rises "from a state of the inward world, 
something like premature age . . . where impulse is born and 
dies in a phantasmal world, pausing in rejection even of a 
shadowy fulfilment" (p. 364). This state of chronic internal 
stagnation, perhaps exacerbated by his undemanding social 
prominence, a surfeit of pleasure, and the absence of any serious 
challenge to his will or energies, engenders Grandcourt's 
psychical crippling, that sense of personal deadness which can 
only be exorcized by controlling and denying the potency of 
others. In Grandcourt's character, all emotional and sexual 
contacts are subordinate to power, and in his two major 
inter-personal relationships — with Lydia and Gwendolen — 
the intense need to master more vital and passionate creatures 
than himself is his sole ambition. As Fromm suggests, "it does 
not cause any sadistic pleasure . . . to inflict a wound on an 
enemy in a fight between equals, because in this situation the 
infliction of the wound is not an expression of control."10 
Grandcourt's desires embody and refine this precept, seeking an 
equal enemy but an unequal contest. "His will must impose 
itself without trouble" (p. 396), while the woman he rules must 
resist (inwardly) to make the victory satisfying; "to be worth his 
mastering it was proper that she should have some spirit" (p. 
195) though that spirit be driven into tortured silence. 
Grandcourt is, in effect, among "those who prefer command to 
love" (p. 646), and in subduing Lydia's and Gwendolen's 
impassioned natures, controlling and stifling their passion 
itself, he finds the only challenge and delight that life still offers 
him: "He had no taste for a woman who was all tenderness to 
him, full of petitioning solicitude and willing obedience. He 
meant to be master of a woman who would have liked to master 
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him, and who perhaps would have been capable of mastering 
another man" (p. 395). 
Lydia and Gwendolen, both beautiful, emotional, and 
domineering, anxious for wealth and social prestige, richly 
possess that dynamic vitality that Grandcourt seeks to destroy. 
Despite their similarities, however, Grandcourt's response to 
each woman is markedly different, a distinction essential to a 
more complete understanding of his character. 
Lydia, "an impassioned, vivacious woman," was attracted to 
the young Grandcourt in a direct, sensual manner. Escaping 
from a "disagreeable husband," she found a "sort of bliss with a 
lover who had completely fascinated her — young, handsome, 
amorous, and living in the best style" (p. 386), a bliss that 
Grandcourt himself apparently shares.11 Whatever Grand-
court's psychosexual state in the early stages of this 
relationship, however, at some point the inner neuroses of this 
once "amorous" lover emerged predominant. Although "his 
passion for her had been the strongest and most lasting he had 
ever known" (p. 386), sexual passion is no longer Grandcourt's 
goal. Lydia, rather, longing for social recognition and her 
children's rights, must endure her frustrating economic 
dependence and uncertainty, a situation inimical to her 
ambitious character and fervent emotions. 
The gratification which Grandcourt derives from Lydia's 
enforced imprisonment, however, far from fulfills his desire for 
utter dominance. She is confined and tyrannized, but her force of 
will and sensual nature make her impervious to complete 
emotional subjugation. Lydia can still exert some power over 
her gaoler in their argument about his mother's diamonds, a gift 
to her which he now wishes to transfer to Gwendolen, and "the 
effect that clung and gnawed within Grandcourt was a sense of 
imperfect mastery" (p. 399). It might be conjectured, therefore, 
that Grandcourt, embittered by his inability to master Lydia 
totally, is driven to seek a more susceptible, gratifying victim. 
And in Gwendolen Harleth, "a creature with a large discourse of 
imaginative fears" (p. 477), whose weaknesses (unlike Lydia's) 
are highly vulnerable to attack, Grandcourt finds the perfect 
victim. 
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Discussing Gwendolen's reaction to Rex's advances, R. T. 
Jones argues that "perhaps we should need resources of 
language to describe it that were not available to George Eliot 
— the resources that D. H . Lawrence developed."12 While 
Gordon Haight's suggestion that Gwendolen evinces latent 
lesbian tendencies is problematical,13 her sexual responses are 
clearly frigid. As Eliot states, Gwendolen "objected, with a sort 
of physical repulsion, to being directly made love to. With all her 
imaginative delight in being adored, there was a certain 
fiercesnes of maidenhood in her" (pp. 101-2). the mere 
"perception that poor Rex wanted to be tender made her curl up 
and harden like a sea-anemone at the touch of a finger" (p. 113). 
Her aversion to Lush, likewise, is specifically described as one of 
her "physical antipathies" as "prominent eyes, fat though not 
clumsy figure, and strong black grey-besprinkled hair of frizzy 
thickness" (p. 157) exude a coarse sexualilty that Gwendolen 
finds revolting.14 Her initial response to Grandcourt reinforces 
this interpretation, for although obviously impressed with his 
wealth and social standing, she is also attracted by his cold, 
unimpassioned love-making, by "the absence of all eagerness in 
his attentions to her" (p. 156): "Clearly it was faint praise to say 
of him that he was not disgusting: he was almost charming; and 
she felt at this moment that it was not likely that she could ever 
have loved another man better than this one. His reticence gave 
her some inexplicable, delightful consciousness" (pp. 373-4). 
Specifically, Gwendolen believes that Grandcourt's sexual 
conduct will be as reserved and lifeless as his courtship. She 
"imagined him always cold and dignified, not likely ever to have 
committed himself. He had hunted the tiger — had he ever been 
in love, or made love? The one experience and the other seemed 
alike remote in Gwendolen's fancy" (p. 174). 
For his part, Grandcourt has no direct knowledge of 
Gwendolen's sexual timidity in the early stages of this 
relationship; his motives for pursuing the marriage, however, 
are clear. Deriving "none of his satisfaction from the belief that 
Gwendolen was in love with him," Grandcourt 
believed that this girl was rather exceptional in the fact that, in spite of 
his assiduous attention to her, she was not in love with him From the 
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very first there had been an exasperating fascination in the tricksiness 
with which she had — not met his advances, but — wheeled away from 
them. She had been brought to accept him in spite of everything — 
brought to kneel down like a horse under training for the arena, though 
she might have an objection to it all the while. On the whole, 
Grandcourt got more pleasure out of this notion than he could have done 
out of winning a girl of whom he was sure that she had a strong 
inclination for him personally, (pp. 364-5) 
Gwendolen's reluctance (manifested particularly in her flight to 
Leubronn) exacerbates Grandcourt's desire, convincing him 
that the victory over such a strong-willed creature will prove 
emotionally fulfilling. 
Her knowledge of his illicit relationship with Lydia is also a 
powerful stimulus. As he proposes marriage to Gwendolen, "his 
strongest wish was to be completely master of this creature — 
this piquant combination of maidenliness and mischief: that she 
knew things which had made her start away from him, spurred 
him to triumph over that repugnance; and he was believing that 
he should triumph" (p. 346, emphasis added). The fact that he 
"attributed her hesitation entirely to her knowledge about Mrs. 
Glasher" (p. 347) only increases his desire; Grandcourt is fully 
aware that Gwendolen's undeveloped conscience is vulnerable, 
and to triumph even over her moral objections magnifies his 
sense of dominance. His response to her later relationship with 
Deronda, for example, as he explicitly attacks her tentative 
though earnest search for moral enlightenment, clearly 
supports this view. Gwendolen never consciously regards 
Daniel as a physical, sexual being, but a priest or mentor who 
had "impressed her as being not her admirer but her superior" 
(p. 468). Grandcourt accurately discerns this emotional-moral 
dependency, and therefore seeks to undermine Gwendolen's 
idealized devotion by casting aspersions on Daniel's 
relationship with Mirah: " 'Men can see what is his relation to 
her'... said Grandcourt, conscious of using pincers on that white 
creature, 'I suppose you take Deronda for a saint' " (p. 649, 
emphasis added). Throughout their relationship, in short, 
Grandcourt displays an acute perception of Gwendolen's 
emotional and moral weaknesses, those aspects of her character 
that are most susceptible to his manipulation. As Gwendolen's 
husband, then, when still more of her character falls under his 
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scrutiny, he gains a greater opportunity to express his sadistic 
desires, creating his own "mini-Colosseum" in "an empire of 
fear" (p. 479). 
The reader does not, of course, witness Grandcourt physically 
abusing Gwendolen, and yet, "in seven short weeks" after their 
marriage, "which seemed half of her life, her husband had 
gained a mastery which she could no more resist than she could 
have resisted the benumbing effect from the touch of a torpedo" 
(p. 477). His strangle-hold on her pride and conscience 
undoubtedly exerts a powerful effect, but the physical, sexual 
element in Grandcourt's domination is perhaps of even greater 
significance. The more important scenes, one is inevitably led to 
speculate, occur between the chapters, in those bedroom 
confrontations that Eliot could not directly depict. 
Despite Eliot's self-censorship, however, a coherent history of 
Grandcourt's and Gwendolen's sexual relations can be 
extrapolated. The animal imagery surrounding Grandcourt 
establishes a primary connection between sexuality, danger, 
and power-lust.16 He is frequently reptilian in appearance — a 
lizard (p. 174), an alligator (p. 195), a boa-constrictor (p. 477), "a 
dangerous serpent ornamentally coiled in her cabin without 
invitation" (p. 735). The equestrian image patterns, through 
which Eliot presents Gwendolen's desire "to mount the chariot 
and drive the plunging horses herself (p. 173) giving way to 
Grandcourt's awareness "that he held his wife with bit and 
bridle" (p. 744) similarly clarify their sexual relationship. 
Grandcourt's sardonic metaphoric image of Gwendolen as a 
horse "brought to kneel down under training for the arena" 
presents a clear and illuminating sexual overtone: she has been 
broken and must now be mounted. 
Their marriage-ceremony and wedding-night are similarly 
replete with suggestions of sexual violence. During the 
ceremony itself, for instance, an illustrative parable is 
circulated among the crowd outside: 
The miller's daughter of fourteen could not believe that high gentry 
behaved badly to their wives, but her mother instructed her — 'Oh, 
child, men's men: gentle or simple, they're much of a muchness. I've 
heard my mother say Squire Pelton used to take his dogs and a long 
whip into his wife's room, and flog 'em there to frighten her.' (p. 400-1) 
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With its unsubtle allusion to Grandcourt (cf. his treatment of his 
dogs), this tale of sadistic sexuality is a symbolic prelude to the 
coming marriage-night. After the marriage, and the three 
intervening chapters, these revealing implications continue. 
Gwendolen's previous delight in male admiration (as opposed to 
direct physical contact) disappears; all masculine sexuality is 
transformed into an object of loathing, and the "fascinated 
gentlemen" of her girlish visions now "presented themselves to 
her imagination with the fatal circumstance that, instead of 
fascinating her in return, they were clad in her own weariness 
and disgust" (p. 484). Gwendolen's now terrified response to 
Grandcourt also reveals the fundamental changes in her 
preconceived opinion of his sexual reticence: "The poor thing 
has passed from her girlish sauciness of superiority over this 
inert specimen of personal distinction into an amazed 
perception of her former ignorance about the possible mental 
attitude of a man towards the woman he sought in marriage" (p. 
480). While it is unlikely that Eliot is suggesting that 
Grandcourt is overtly violent with his wife intheir sexual 
relations — Gwendolen's neurotic fears of sexual contact, and 
Grandcourt's hatred of being "forced into anything like 
violence" (p. 396) make brutality doubtful — the psychological 
effect is essentially the same. Grandcourt has realized 
Gwendolen's sexual fears, and, simply demanding his marital 
rights, enjoys her unspoken revulsion and his own vastly 
enhanced mastery.17 Gwendolen's fantasies about Grandcourt's 
death, brought to their height by the unendurable physical 
proximity on the yacht, are germane to this analysis: 
Inarticulate prayers, no more definite than a cry, often swept out from 
her into the vast silence, unbroken except by her husband's breathing or 
the plash of the wave or the creaking of the masts.... It was sometimes 
after a white-lipped, fierce-eyed temptation with murdering fingers had 
made its demon-visit that these best moments of inward crying and 
clinging for rescue would come to her, and she would lie with wide-open 
eyes in which the rising tears seemed a blessing, (p. 738) 
The physical setting is unobtrusively yet strikingly visualized: 
terrified and humiliated after having been forced to submit to 
sexual intercourse, Gwendolen, fighting her homicidal temp-
tations, tormented by her sexual fears, lies sleeplessly in bed 
with Grandcourt. 
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Beyond all this, moreover, in two highly emblematic scenes 
(involving the conflict over the diamonds), Eliot offers an even 
clearer account of that dramatic wedding-night. As Eliot herself 
notes, "what had occurred between about her wearing the 
diamonds was typical" (p. 480), a statement which must be seen 
in the full light of their relationship: 
Her little coquetries, voluntary or involuntary, had told on Grandcourt 
during courtship, and formed a medium of communication between 
them, showing him in the light of a creature such as she could 
understand and manage: but marriage had nullified all such 
interchange, and Grandcourt had become a blank uncertainty to her in 
all but this, that he would do just what he willed, and that she had 
neither devices at her command to determine his will, nor any rational 
means of escaping it. (p. 480) 
Aggravating Grandcourt's need to dominate this elusive 
quarry, Gwendolen's "little coquetries" revealed to him (at least 
in part) the essential weaknesses of her character: " 'Then I am 
not to ask for one kiss,' said Grandcourt, contented to pay a large 
price for this new kind of love-making, which introduced 
marriage by the finest contrast. 'Not one!' said Gwendolen, 
getting saucy, and nodding at him defiantly" (p. 373, emphasis 
added). When, on her wedding-night, Gwendolen receives the 
diamonds and a bitter letter from Lydia, she falls into 
un-controllable hysteria, and Grandcourt's tentative suspicions 
are brought to full consciousness: 
After that long while, there was a tap at the door and Grandcourt 
entered, dressed for dinner. The sight of him brought a new nervous 
shock, and Gwendolen screamed again and again with hysterical 
violence. He had expected to see her dressed and smiling, ready to be led 
down. He saw her pallid, shrieking as it seemed with terror, the jewels 
scattered around her on the floor, (p. 407) 
The scene resonates with sexual implications, the time (the 
reader's final view of Gwendolen and Grandcourt on their 
wedding-night), the jewels (given to both Grandcourt's sexual 
partners), and Gwendolen's "hysterical violence" (which must 
be seen in conjunction with her fear of men) all contributing to 
the suggestion of imminent sadistic sexuality. 
The second diamond scene further elucidates the sexual 
nature of their power-struggle. Though Gwendolen initially 
refused to wear the jewels, "her fear of him . . . had reached a 
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superstitious point" (p. 481) and she is powerless before 
Grandcourt's imperious demands: "She fancied that his eyes 
showed a delight in torturing her. How could she be defiant? She 
had nothing to say that would touch him — nothing but what 
would give him a more painful grasp on her consciousness. 'He 
delights in making the dogs and horses quail: that is half his 
pleasure in called them his' " (pp. 481-2). Thoroughly cowed by 
her terror, Gwendolen can only passively endure Grandcourt's 
advances: 
'You want some one to fasten them,' he said, coming towards her. 
She did not answer, but simply stood still, leaving him to take out the 
ornaments and fasten them as he would 
'What makes you so cold?' said Grandcourt, when he had fastened the 
last ear-ring. 'Pray put plenty of furs on. I hate to see a woman come into 
a room looking frozen. If you are to appear as a bride at all, appear 
decently.' 
This marital speech was not exactly persuasive, but it touched the quick 
of Gwendolen's pride and forced her to rally. . . . Grandcourt inwardly 
observed that she answered to the rein. (p. 482) 
In this confrontation, Gwendolen's physical fear of Grandcourt, 
his pleasure in tormenting her, her unresponsive frigidity, and 
the suggestive equestrian imagery coalesce to produce a 
paradigm of their sexual relations. Gwendolen must submit to 
wearing the diamonds "on her neck, in her ears, in her hair" (pp. 
458-9), subdued and humiliated by Grandcourt's demands. 
Grandcourt's response to Gwendolen's inner anxieties, then, 
is psychologically consistent with the character Eliot has 
delineated. Unlike his affair with the less vulnerable Lydia, his 
marriage, bringing "more of aim into his life, new objects to 
exert his will upon" (p. 645), has thoroughly satisfied his 
sadistic impulses. If Grandcourt had truly expected to see 
Gwendolen "dressed and smiling" in the first diamond scene, he 
had certainly "not repented of his marriage" (p. 645) afterwards, 
for he "had found a motive to exercise his tenacity — that of 
making his marriage answer all the ends he chose, and with the 
more completeness the more he discerned any opposing with in 
her" (p. 608). Far from proving a disappointment, Gwendolen's 
anguished tension between resistance and resignation ideally 
gratifies Grandcourt's desires. Her sexual frigidity, in fact, is 
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even more gratifying than her previous hysteria, offering him a 
perverse satisfaction in the knowledge that she suffers inwardly 
without overt defiance. 
Despite the bewilderment expressed by Lush in the epigraph 
to this paper, therefore, Grandcourt's actions and psychology 
are not inexplicable. His deep-rooted lack of vitality and passion 
has generated an intense need to confine and control those 
qualities in others, to gain release from his impotence by 
suffocating the potency of his victims. He is unique among 
Eliot's darker creations. Her earlier villains, though equally 
egoistic, are more pathetic or confused than evil, exemplifying 
Daniel Deronda's axiom that "want of sympathy condemns us to 
a corresponding stupidity" (p. 658); the pier-glass of ego 
effectively blinds such characters as Hetty, Arthur, Casaubon, 
Bulstrode, and Rosamund to the inner workings of another's 
mind and to the true consequences of their own actions.18 
However, though it is not expressed in a like axiom, Daniel 
Deronda also offers a contrasting point of view. Throughout her 
portrayal of Grandcourt, Eliot reverses her previous pattern 
and accentuates the fact that his understanding of the other is 
far from limited; he comprehends the nature of his victims and 
exploits that knowledge of their weaknesses to gain his perverse 
sense of pleasure and excitation. In Eliot's depiction of his 
character, he experiences no guilt, no self-delusion, no remorse, 
and possesses none of the mitigating blindness or inner 
confusion that temper the reader's response to her earlier 
villains. 
This uncompromising portrait, however, confronts Eliot with 
a profound philosophic-artistic dilemma: to continue quest-
ioning the underlying basis of her moral theory, or to qualify 
Grandcourt's challenging presence, converting Daniel 
Deronda's conscious sadist into a Middlemarch egoist whose 
actions produce evil but whose lack of understanding palliates 
his culpability. The passages in which Grandcourt's 
self-knowledge, imaginative insight, and deliberate intent are 
reduced are admittedly minor, but the simple fact that Eliot 
undertakes to transform those precise qualities clearly 
demonstrates her awareness of the central problem 
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This process of transformation begins tentatively: 
Grandcourt could not indeed fully imagine how things affected 
Gwendolen: he had no imagination of anything in her but what affected 
the gratification of his own will; but on this point he had the sensibility 
which seems like divination. What we see exclusively we are apt to see 
with some mistake of proportions; and Grandcourt was not likely to be 
infallible in his judgments concerning this wife who was governed by 
many shadowy powers, to him non-existent. He magnified her inward 
resistance, but that did not lessen his satisfaction in the mastery of it. 
(p. 616) 
Still asserting that Grandcourt acutely perceives fundamental 
aspects of Gwendolen's psyche and derives intense gratification 
by tyrannizing his wife, Eliot also begins to question the extent 
of his insight, claiming that, like the befuddled villians of her 
earlier fiction, Grandcourt's egoism obscures his full 
understanding, a claim that becomes increasingly apparent and 
less tentative as the novel progresses. Grandcourt's 
interpretation of the conflict between Lydia and Gwendolen is 
an illuminating example. Eliot argues that 
Grandcourt lacked the only organ of thinking that could have saved him 
from mistake — namely, some experience of the mixed passions 
concerned. He had correctly divined one half of Gwendolen's dread — all 
that related to her personal pride, and her perception that his will must 
conquer hers; but the remorseful half, even if he had known of her 
broken promise, was as much out of his imagination as the other side of 
the moon. (pp. 657-8) 
This analysis returns us to the classic pattern of Eliot's moral 
theory: understanding derives from the personal experience of a 
similar emotion, and thus Grandcourt, lacking any "mixed 
passion," can see only Gwendolen's pride and fear, not her 
remorse. Continuing this argument, Eliot suggests that what 
Grandcourt "believed her to feel about Lydia was solely a 
tongue-tied jealousy, and what he believed Lydia to have 
written with the jewels was the fact that she had once been used 
to wearing them, with other amenities such as he imputed to the 
intercourse of jealous women" (p. 658). Earlier, however, Eliot 
suggested that Grandcourt had "felt sure that Lydia had 
enclosed something with the diamonds, and that this 
something, whatever it was, had at once created in Gwendolen a 
new repulsion for him and a reason for not daring to manifest it" 
(p. 479), a recognition of more than mere jealousy. The desire to 
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triumph over Gwendolen despite her incipient moral scruples, 
furthermore, was a major motive for Grandcourt's proposal. The 
fact that Gwendolen "knew things which had made her start 
away from him, spurred him to triumph over that repugnance," 
for he had recognized the intensity of her feelings about Mrs. 
Glasher and sought to increase his domination by conquering 
and exploiting her moral qualms. 
Continuing to mitigate Grandcourt's awareness and 
intention, Eliot's qualifications gradually assume more 
directness. On the one hand, Grandcourt had formerly not only 
recognized Gwendolen's violent physical antipathy to Lush, but 
had employed it as a subtle yet effective punishment for her 
interest in Deronda. Returning from Lady Mallinger's party, for 
example, Gwendolen fears that her earnest conversation with 
Daniel has aroused her husband's anger: 
But Grandcourt made no observation on her behaviour. All he said as 
they were driving home was — 
'Lush will dine with us among the other people to-morrow. You will 
treat him civilly.' 
Gwendolen's heart began to beat violently. The words that she wanted 
to utter, as one wants to return a blow, were, 'You are breaking your 
promise to me — the first promise you made me.' But she dared not utter 
them. She was as frightened at a quarrel as if she had foreseen that it 
would end with throttling fingers of her neck. (p. 626) 
On the other hand, Eliot later argues that Grandcourt no longer 
recognizes the cruelty of compelling his wife to endure Lush's 
company. Angered by the "confounded nonsense" that continues 
between Deronda and Gwendolen, Grandcourt perceives the 
"threatening moods in Gwendolen which the unity between 
them in his views of marriage required him peremptorily to 
check" (p. 656). He therefore decides that Lush will 
communicate the conditions of his will to Gwendolen, an act (as 
in the previous incident) of calculated cruelty. Eliot, however, 
now suggests that his motives are significantly less conscious, 
for "in his employment of Lush he did not intend an insult to her: 
she ought to understand that he was the only possible envoy" (p. 
658). Regardless of Lush's debatable indispensability, in light of 
the earlier scene Eliot's argument that Grandcourt does not 
realize and intend that Lush's company will be utterly insulting 
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to Gwendolen is unconvincing; in both cases, Grandcourt knows 
that Gwendolen harbours a special feeling for Deronda and 
employs the same punishment. 
This diminishment of Grandcourt's conscious cruelty is given 
its most adamant articulation in Eliot's analysis of 
Grandcourt's supposed state of mind during the Mediterranean 
cruise. Eliot asks 
Had Grandcourt the least conception of what was going on in the breast 
of this wife? He conceived that she did not love him: but was that 
necessary? She was under his power . . . But what lay quite away from 
his conception was, that she could have any special repulsion for him 
personally. How could she? He himself knew what personal repulsion 
was — nobody better . . . Hence he understood her repulsion for Lush. 
But how was he to understand or conceive her present repulsion for 
Henleigh Grandcourt? . . . He had all his life had reason to take a 
flattering view of his own attractiveness, and to place himself in fine 
antithesis to the men who, he saw at once, must be revolting to a woman 
of taste. He had no idea of a moral repulsion, and could not have 
believed, if he had been told it, that there may be a resentment and 
disgust which will gradually make beauty more detestable than 
ugliness, through exasperation at the outward virtue in which hateful 
things can flaunt themselves or find a supercilious advantage. 
How, then, could Grandcourt divine what was going on in Gwendolen's 
breast? (pp. 734-5). 
At this intense point in the novel — the isolation of Grandcourt 
and Gwendolen on the yacht — Eliot cannot leave the emotional 
and psychosexual overtones of this encounter unanalysed. Such 
an explication, however, involves the necessity of probing 
deeply into the nature of Grandcourt's acute awareness of 
Gwendolen's inner fears and his conscious delight in her 
subjugation, acknowledging that Grandcourt's evil is not in fact 
based upon a lack of understanding. Confronted by this 
prospect, Eliot's philosophic-moral impulses lead her to 
contradict the portrait she has already revealed, asserting that 
Grandcourt is blind to Gwendolen's sexual frigidity, that he is 
oblivious to the concept of moral repulsion, that he is unable to 
comprehend her inner life, a series of qualifications that bears 
little resemblance to the Grandcourt that Eliot has delineated. 
Grandcourt's final appearances continue to display Eliot's 
ambivalence. On the one hand, his sexual menace is unabated: 
"There seemed to be a magical effect in this close vicinity. 
Gwendolen shrank and ceased to sob. She kept her eyelids down, 
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and clasped her hands tightly" (p. 744). Grandcourt's need to 
dominate and his capacity to discern the essential weaknesses 
in his wife's character are similarly unaffected. Gwendolen 
acknowledges that "this dual solitude in a boat was the more 
attractive to him because it would be wearisome to her" (p. 7420, 
and Grandcourt experiences "the gratified impulse of a strong 
will" by forcing her into this physical closeness (p. 745). On the 
other hand, Eliot also insists that his insight remains 
egoistically clouded as he interprets Gwendolen's psyche "with 
the narrow correctness which leaves a world of unknown feeling 
behind" (p. 742). Eliot's two conceptions of Grandcourt remain 
unreconciled and his timely death nullifies but does not resolve 
her dilemma. 
Grandcourt's true importance in Daniel Deronda, then, 
reveals a central problem in Eliot's moral philosophy. One of the 
major questions confronting Victorian agnostics was the 
creation of a system of ethics without divine sanction. Eliot's 
secular Religion of Humanity responded by maintaining that 
the sympathetic imagination is the proper basis for man's moral 
sense and that, although evil exists in the human world, it is the 
result of moral immaturity or egoistic self-blindness rather 
than a willing decision to embrace perversity. Such humanistic 
idealism, however, as Knoepflmacher points out, can lead to 
significant distortions in the novelist's presentation of 
character. For a substantial portion of Daniel Deronda, Eliot 
confronts the possibility that an individual can recognize 
another's equivalent centre of self and yet attempt to achieve 
mastery through that recognition, unsympathetically and 
knowingly exploiting the other's inner fears. And perhaps it 
should be added that in this morally earnest novel where 
Daniel's own character and pontifications express Eliot's 
principal humanistic beliefs, the distortion that Knoepflmacher 
describes is inevitable; Daniel Deronda's moral ideology cannot, 
in effect, accommodate a character who sees, but refuses, the 
light. In her qualifying passages, Eliot never denies that 
Grandcourt engages in sexual terrorism; it is only his conscious 
delight in the knowledge that his is subjecting Gwendolen to 
pain that Eliot ambiguously refutes. 
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The ethos of Eliot's agnosticism therefore encounters a 
serious challenge in Henleigh Grandcourt, a character not 
egoistically blinded to the "I-Thou" relationship, and yet whose 
imagination remains devoid of sympathy. Reflecting more of 
Victorian opinion, Dickens could assert that there are people 
"who have no good in them . . . whom it is necessary to detest 
without compromise . . . who must be dealt with as enemies of 
the human race."22 Eliot's own Calvinistic upbringing, stressing 
an equal awareness of man's sinfulness, would have endorsed 
Dicken's sentiments, leading one to speculate that the 
uncompromised portrait of Grandcourt's conscious evil is in fact 
the point of conflict between two primary forces in Eliot's mind 
— the evangelical and humanistic — rather than a seeming 
anomaly. Whatever Grandcourt's roots in Eliot's intell-
ectual-cultural heritage, however, her mature moral theories 
could never accept such a figure. And since Daniel Deronda's 
moral philosophy will not change to accommodate Grandcourt, 
Grandcourt must be changed, his conscious sadism reduced to 
self-delusion and moral obtuseness. Following Grandcourt's 
death, the novel's only surviving villainous (or quasi-villainous) 
character is the elder Lapidoth, as pathetic and petty an emblem 
of evil as any among Eliot's previous dark figures. The large 
questions raised by Grandcourt's deliberate evil and insightful 
perceptiveness, the tension between the evangelical and 
humanistic viewpoints, the intense inquiry into the moral 
limitations of imaginative sympathy remain unresolved. 
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